SYSTEMS · GOVERNANCE · VERIFICATION

Engineering AI systems that can be inspected, evaluated, and trusted.

I’m Jusstin DeRemus. I design and build evidence-oriented tools and protocols for AI operations, continuity, code analysis, and system integrity—with a bias toward inspectable behavior over impressive claims.

Local-firstPrefer minimal trust surface
Evidence-ledClaims tied to artifacts
Failure-awareLimits stay visible
E&ICONTROL
PLANE
PROVENANCEPOLICYEVIDENCE
Architecture before automation
01 / A PRACTICE BUILT AROUND PROOFSALEM, OREGON · OPEN TO TECHNICAL COLLABORATION
01 AI systems architecture
02 Governance & protocol design
03 Verification & auditability
04 Applied software engineering

SELECTED WORK / 02

Systems with a paper trail.

A focused selection of public work, described at the maturity the available source supports. Repository documentation is not a substitute for independent production validation.

02 / CODE INTELLIGENCEIMPLEMENTED

CRIT — Code Review & Intelligence Tool

Static heuristics paired with structured AI review.

A Python MVP includes AST-oriented code analysis, a local SAST scanner, and an LLM review orchestration path. The inspected scanner has explicit heuristic rules; its limits mean it should not be presented as a comprehensive security analyzer.

  • Python AST
  • SAST heuristics
  • LLM orchestration
  • Redaction
03 / GOVERNANCEACCESS BLOCKED

EAIN Stabilization Command Center

Candidate project retained in the evidence inventory, not presented as a verified case study. The connected GitHub read returned 404 in this session, so current source, tests, and revision could not be inspected.

CASE FILE / 01PUBLIC SOURCE REVIEW

UNIVERSAL SEED SUMMARY ENGINE

Continuity that can be inspected.

TESTS DEFINED IN SOURCE

Problem & approach

Conversation handoffs can lose constraints, provenance, and important negative findings. USS formalizes a pipeline that turns a transcript into a normalized thread, applies redaction, compiles a runtime prompt, and produces a summary plus validation, evidence-map, inspection, and generation artifacts.

Design constraints

Local-first operation, explicit protocol input, redaction before generation, and inspectable output artifacts reduce dependence on opaque conversational state. Provider activation exists in source, but live-provider success is not established by the inspected documentation.

Implementation evidence

  • ✓
    Source present

    src/uss_engine/ contains CLI, transcript, redactor, validator, evidence, inspector, and run pipeline modules.

  • ✓
    Static end-to-end tests defined

    tests/test_e2e_static.py checks summary validity, six output artifacts, and the static CLI path.

  • !
    Live providers not verified here

    The repository's live-provider validation document describes a procedure; it is not evidence that credentials or provider calls succeeded in this session.

Trade-offs & limits

Static-path tests do not establish semantic quality, resistance to every sensitive-data pattern, or reliable behavior with external providers. Those require additional environment-specific testing.

MATURITY: IMPLEMENTED · TESTS DEFINEDInspect test source ↗Inspect redactor ↗
CASE FILE / 02PUBLIC SOURCE REVIEW

CRIT · CODE REVIEW & INTELLIGENCE TOOL

Useful signals, bounded claims.

IMPLEMENTED

Problem & approach

CRIT aims to combine local code-pattern scanning with structured AI-assisted evaluation. The inspected repository includes an AST-based scanner and a protocol orchestrator that defines structured findings and evidence references.

Architecture observations

sast.py visits Python AST call nodes and flags selected patterns including eval/exec, subprocess.run(shell=True), weak hash calls, and a narrow SQL-string heuristic. The orchestrator includes Pydantic models and deterministic regex-based redaction.

What the code does not prove

  • !
    Heuristic coverage is narrow

    The scanner is not a complete vulnerability detector; its SQL rule is based on limited syntax patterns.

  • !
    Parse errors are suppressed

    The inspected scan() catches broad exceptions and returns accumulated findings, which can make parse failure hard to distinguish from a clean scan.

  • !
    Runtime behavior not executed

    Source files and project metadata were inspected remotely; the application and its tests were not run in this session.

Trade-offs & limits

AI-assisted review depends on model availability, prompt design, and output validation. Security effectiveness needs adversarial test coverage and measured false-positive/false-negative analysis.

MATURITY: IMPLEMENTED · NOT RUNTIME-VERIFIED HEREInspect scanner source ↗Inspect orchestrator ↗

METHODS & ARCHITECTURE / 03

Trust is a property to test.

A practical method for making complex AI workflows legible: define boundaries, make state explicit, preserve provenance, and test failure paths.

A / 01
⌁

Decompose the system

Map responsibilities, interfaces, dependencies, data flow, and trust boundaries before adding automation.

ARCHITECTURE
B / 02
⟡

Make evidence addressable

Connect material claims to source locations, test outputs, revisions, or explicit unknowns.

PROVENANCE
C / 03
⊘

Fail closed by design

Define what happens when validation fails, context is missing, or a dependency cannot be trusted.

GOVERNANCE
D / 04
↻

Verify the behavior

Separate intended design from implemented code, executed tests, reproducible demos, and deployment evidence.

VERIFICATION
“

Architecture before code. Evidence before confidence. Limitations stay in the record.

WORKING PRINCIPLE / E&I

EVIDENCE REGISTER / 04

What is known—and what isn't.

Evidence labels describe the basis of each statement, not a grade of overall project quality.

CLAIMSTATUSBASIS / BOUNDARY
USS source modules and static tests existVERIFIED

Public default-branch tree and test source inspected; runtime tests were not executed here.

USS external providers work end-to-endUNKNOWN

Documentation describes validation steps; no live-provider run was observed in this session.

CRIT contains an AST scanner and redaction logicVERIFIED

Public source files inspected; implementation presence is not a security-effectiveness claim.

CRIT reliably prevents prompt injectionUNVERIFIED

README language is stronger than the source review can substantiate; no adversarial evaluation was run.

Private candidate repositories are availableBLOCKED

GitHub API returned 404 for EAIN Stabilization Command Center, Void Sentinel Console, and Gatekeepers in this session.

Portfolio is live on the custom domainNOT DEPLOYED

No hosting or DNS access was confirmed; this deliverable is a local static website package.

This register is a point-in-time review. Source branches can change; linked repositories remain the authoritative place to inspect current code.

ABOUT / 05

Engineering with an explicit trust boundary.

I work at the intersection of AI operations, protocol design, continuity, and applied software. My focus is on the mechanisms that make systems easier to inspect: clear contracts, deliberate state transitions, validation, redaction, evidence maps, and honest failure reporting.

I value small stable implementations, local-first workflows where practical, and the distinction between “the design says” and “the system demonstrably does.”

NEXT CONVERSATION

Bring a hard problem.
Make the evidence visible.

Open GitHub profile ↗